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Toward the end of the eighteenth century, a moral philosopher from northern Europe
gave birth to a mode of inquiry that would eventually become the predominant
paradigm in the social sciences. Did The Wealth of Nations hatch fully grown from the
mind of Adam Smith, as Athena burst from Zeus’ brow? No, Irwin’s history shows
that Smith’s ideas were grounded in a British intellectual tradition whose roots were
in premercantilist thought. Drawing on a wealth of early pamphlets, Irwin argues that
many prototypical economic ideas were ﬁrst developed by government ofﬁcials and
merchants confronting practical problems about commercial policy and overseas trade.
But Irwin is careful to make explicit at the outset that this work is an intellectual
history of free trade, not a discussion of how politicians have abused the ideas of some
of the greatest economists and protected the special interests of their constituencies.
Indeed, what makes this volume so charming is that there is no doctrine on which
there is wider assent among modern economists. One’s ideas about free trade and com
parative advantage are the Rorschach Test for our discipline. At the end of the twen
tieth century, if you do not believe in free trade, you had better be a pretty good applied
game theorist. Otherwise, you run the risk of being branded “not a real economist”
and exiled to a vaguely unfashionable academic address, as happened to Robert Reich
recently when he returned from service as the Secretary of Labor. Likewise, the under
graduate who doesn’t understand comparative advantage risks failing Principles of
Economics.
One of the pleasures of reading an intellectual history of free trade is to encounter
the great thinkers and grand ideas in the broad sweep of the history of economic
thought. Two of the ﬁnest philosophers of the English-speaking world, Hume and Mill,
bent their mind to these topics, struggling to clarify how international trade affected a
country’s well-being. And the moral philosopher Smith’s compelling metaphor, the
invisible hand that guides a self-interested individual to promote the social good, is
drawn so that he can make his case for free trade. This doctrine endures precisely
because some of our best minds have developed its deeper implications.
Irwin shows that Henry Martyn clearly understood comparative advantage at the
beginning of the eighteenth century, and we can now see in Smith’s faith in the market
as a social institution the early roots of the Two Welfare Theorems. Also, Mill devised
the compensation principle largely to make the case for free trade, and the reader
learns that Pareto developed his criterion in reaction to Mill’s and then applied it incor
rectly in the defense of free trade. These are the shoulders of giants.
Torrens, who understood that productive efﬁciency was as important as allocative
efﬁciency, adumbrated and then Ricardo popularized the notion of comparative advan

tage. Did Torrens sully his great insight by also sensing that tariffs might improve the
terms of trade? No, Edgeworth developed the offer curve to clarify the argument, and
the foundations of general equilibrium theory and cooperative game theory are a felic
itous byproduct. A century later, our profession still beneﬁts from this exchange.
One also encounters lesser minds in these pages. Manoïlescu, an erstwhile Roman
ian Minister of Industry and Trade, made an incoherent case for protectionism by
asserting that modern economies had wage differentials between sectors. His convo
luted thinking spurred Viner to develop the model of speciﬁc factors. Then Lipsey and
Lancaster’s Theory of the Second Best, one of the great insights of our ﬁeld in this
century, showed unequivocally that one must be agnostic about the effects of tariffs
on an economy with distortions in the labor market. Likewise, Keynes’ sophomoric
ﬁxation with an overvalued pound sterling led him to make arguments in favor of tem
porary protectionism as a response to the widespread unemployment of the Depres
sion. The ultimate effect of these ideas was the design of the international institutions
that have promoted free trade and fostered unprecedented global prosperity in ﬁfty
years since Keynes’ passing.
There are two minor deﬁciencies in Irwin’s history. First, it is obvious that he is
limited by his linguistic ability to an analysis of texts in English. Thus Ibn Khaldoun
is not mentioned in the chapter on early ideas on foreign trade, the contributions of
Antonio Serra to mercantilist thought are neglected, and the discussions of the intel
lectual history of trade in classical antiquity focus solely on Greek and Latin writings
that have been translated into English. Second, although Irwin’s economic instincts are
quite sound, there is at times a curious lack of economic theory as a unifying artiﬁce
to bind together the sometimes disjointed ideas that history presents. For example,
Irwin puts mathematical notation on only one page, and here it serves simply to sum
marize a present-value calculation contrasting the costs and beneﬁts from imposing a
temporary tariff in protecting an infant industry! And in a book that deals so centrally
with ideas in applied general equilibrium theory, it is surprising that there is no mention
of Walras and little discussion of the origin of Pareto’s fundamental ideas.
But the joys of reading this work are quite substantial indeed. One is often left with
the peculiar impression that great minds were somehow bafﬂed about issues that now
seem so clear to us. Of course, this is the technique of the intellectual historian; the
original ideas seem at times confused only because we are now the beneﬁciaries of two
centuries’ accumulation of scientiﬁc knowledge. The book’s last chapter looks forward
to a future for the idea of free trade, and it calls properly for a greater emphasis on
fuller empirical measures of the beneﬁts of free trade. This appeal is in keeping with
the broad positivism that underlies Irwin’s scholarship and, to a large extent, the history
of the idea of free trade itself.
Still, there is a deeper sense in which the idea of unfettered trade holds sway on us
economists. Free trade may be part of the Lakatosian hard core of our scientiﬁc
program, and we might put less faith in statistical measures of Harberger triangles than
in the admittedly imprecise notion that the invisible hand serves to check individual
self-interest and thus to promote the public good. Hume and Smith were right: this
may not be the best of all possible worlds, but it is easy to see how political impedi
ments to voluntary trade can make it worse.

